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Abstract 
This study examines the time-varying correlations between oil prices shocks of different types 
(supply-side, aggregate demand and oil-market specific demand as per Kilian (2009) who 
highlighted that “Not all oil shocks are alike”) and stock market returns, using a Scalar-BEKK 
model. For this study we consider the aggregate stock market indices from two countries, China 
and the US, reflecting the most important developing and developed financial markets in the 
world. In addition to the whole market, we also consider correlations from key selected industrial 
sectors, namely Metals & Mining, Oil & Gas, Retail, Technology and Banking. The sample 
period runs from 1995 until 2013. We highlight several key points: (i) correlations between oil 
price shocks and stock returns are clearly and systematically time-varying; (ii) oil shocks of 
different types show substantial variation in their impact upon stock market returns; (iii) these 
effects differ widely across industrial sectors; and finally (iv) China is seemingly more resilient 
to oil price shocks than the US.  
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1. Introduction and brief review of the literature 
In this paper we extend the works of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009) by examining 
how the financial returns of the aggregate stock market and of key industrial sectors co-vary with 
different types of oil price shocks, and how this co-variance has strengthened (or weakened) over 
time. In particular, dynamic conditional correlations are evaluated using the Scalar-BEKK model 
proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) to examine the aforementioned time-varying relationship. 
The pioneer in the study of oil prices and macroeconomic indicators was Hamilton (1983). Since 
then a vast amount of studies have been published and the majority of them voice the opinion 
that oil prices exert a significant impact on economic variables (some influential papers include, 
inter alia, Baumeister and Peersman, 2012; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Segal, 2011; Rahman and 
Serletis, 2011; Tang et al., 2010; Jbir and Zouari-Ghorbel, 2009; Nakov and Pescatori, 2009; 
Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Hamilton, 2008, 1996; Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Barsky and 
Kilian, 2004; Jones et al., 2004; Leduc and Sill, 2004; Brown and Yucel, 2002; Hooker, 2002, 
1996; Amano and van Norden, 1998; Bernanke et al., 1997; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996; 
Huang et al., 1996; Darrat et al., 1996; Mork et al., 1994; Hutchison, 1993; Mork, 1989; and 
Burbidge and Harrison, 1984). Despite the fact that the oil literature dates back into the early 80s, 
the relationship between oil prices and stock markets has received a marked increase in attention 
by researchers only over the last two decades
1
. The picture that is painted by these studies 
advocates in favour of a negative relationship between oil price changes and stock market 
performance (see, inter alia, Asteriou and Bashmakova, 2013; Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2013; 
Ciner, 2013; Lee and Chiou, 2011; Laopodis, 2011; Filis, 2010; Chen, 2009; Miller and Ratti, 
2009; Driesprong et al., 2008; Nandha and Faff, 2008; O'Neill et al., 2008; Park and Ratti, 2008; 
Bachmeier, 2008; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Sadorsky, 2001; Papapetrou, 2001; Ciner, 
2001; Gjerde and Sættem, 1999; Huang et al., 1996; Jones and Kaul, 1996).  
Furthermore, the literature had remained generally silent until very recently regarding the effects 
of oil prices on the stock market industrial sectors. Some interesting studies include those by 
Degiannakis et al. (2013), Scholtens and Yurtsever (2012), Arouri (2012), Broadstock et al. 
(2012), Narayan and Sharma (2011), Arouri (2011), Elyasiani et al. (2011), Mohanty et al. 
                                                          
1
 It is not immediately clear why this surge of study has been within the past decade or so, but several points may 
contribute: first the availability of daily data online through numerous web portals has been massively improved; 
second the methods for handling volatile data were not „mainstream‟ until recent years; and third the sheer volume 
of papers being published has risen dramatically in the last few years (particularly in some leading energy related 
journals), generating a sheer scale effect. 
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(2011), Arouri et al. (2011), Arouri and Nguyen (2010), Kilian and Park (2009), Nandha and 
Faff (2008), Boyer and Filion (2007), El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Hammoudeh and Li (2005). 
The general consensus from these studies is that the Oil & Gas sector, and also the Mining sector, 
tends to be positively affected by positive changes in oil prices, whereas the reverse holds true 
for other sectors, such as Transportation, Manufacturing, Food, Chemicals, Medical, Computer, 
Real Estate and General Services. Inconclusive results are reported for the Electricity, 
Engineering and Financial sectors. Thus, overall it could be suggested that there is a positive 
effect of the oil prices on oil-related and oil-substitute sectors, a negative effect on oil-using 
sectors and not a significant effect on non-oil-related sectors (such as the financial sector)
2
. 
Following Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2008a,b, 2009), we also subscribe to the belief that 
we cannot paint a complete picture on the relationship between oil prices and the economy or the 
financial markets, unless we separate the origins of the oil price shocks. These authors were the 
first to distinguish between supply-side and demand-side oil price shocks, arguing that these 
shocks would trigger different responses from the economic indicators and financial markets. We 
should add here that Kilian (2009) disentangles further the demand-side oil price shocks into 
aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks (or oil-market specific demand 
shocks) in an effort to capture the oil price shocks that originate from an increase in world 
aggregate demand and those that originate from the increased demand due to uncertainty about 
the future availability of oil, respectively. Pertaining to the readily available information, a 
positive relationship has been established between aggregate demand shocks and economic 
and/or stock market developments, whereas a negative relationship holds during oil-market 
specific demand shocks. At this point it is worth noting that at the other end of the spectrum, 
there is a growing body of literature shaping around the concept that supply-side oil price shocks 
do not exercise any effects anymore on either the economy or the financial markets (see, inter 
alia, Degiannakis et al., 2014; Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kang and Ratti, 2013; Baumeister and 
Peersman, 2012; Basher et al., 2012; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Kilian and Lewis, 2011; Kilian and 
Park, 2009; Hamilton, 2009a,b; Kilian, 2009; Apergis and Miller, 2009; Lescaroux and Mignon, 
2008; Kilian, 2008a,b; and Barsky and Kilian, 2004). Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2014) focus on 
                                                          
2
 Gogineni (2010) offers compelling justification and logic behind these general findings noting that supply chain 
dependency (and hence exposure) to oil markets is key to determining the relevance of oil price changes in any 
given sector. 
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France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US and report that supply side shocks exercise a more 
persistent effect on stock prices. 
The aforementioned studies, though, have largely ignored the importance of examining the 
relationship between oil prices and stock markets in a time-varying environment. Time-varying 
correlation models have only very recently been applied to investigate oil and stock market 
relationships. Some notable studies include for instance Choi and Hammoudeh (2010) who apply 
the Dynamic Conditional Correlation model (DCC) to investigate relationships between 
commodity prices including oil, copper, gold and silver, with the S&P 500 index and show 
evidence of increasing correlations between all commodities since 2003 but decreasing 
correlations with the stock index. Similarly, Chang et al. (2010) show that in the US, conditional 
correlations between crude oil prices and stock returns are not constant. Filis et al. (2011) go 
further and separate oil importing from exporting countries in their analysis and, using a DCC 
generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (DCC-GARCH) specification, show 
that during oil-market specific demand shocks a negative relationship between oil and stock 
market returns exists, whereas a positive correlation was observed during aggregate demand 
shocks. More recently, Broadstock et al. (2012) use a BEKK model to identify the time-varying 
relationship between oil prices and energy related stocks in China, identifying a sharp increase in 
correlation during the 2008 financial crisis, while Antonakakis and Filis (2013) examine the 
time-varying effects of oil prices changes on stock market correlation, using a DCC-GARCH 
model. 
This paper links two strands of the literature (oil-price shocks and time-varying correlation 
between oil price and stock market returns) in an effort to reveal some rather important findings 
which have not been reported previously. Overall, the innovations of this paper can be described 
succinctly as follows. First, we disentangle oil prices into specific shock series using Kilian‟s 
(2009) framework, namely supply, aggregate demand and oil-market specific demand based 
shocks. Using these, we examine the time-varying relationship between each of the three shocks 
and stock market returns. Second, we examine the said relationship for both aggregate stock 
market indices and selected industrial sector indices. Finally, we examine this relationship in the 
most important developed (US) and developing (China) stock markets in the world, using a 
Scalar-BEKK model. As Broadstock et al. (2012) argue, despite the fact that China represents 
the second largest economy in the world and that the Chinese stock market is the second largest 
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stock market in the world, there is not an extensive literature examining the relationship between 
oil price and stock market behaviour in China.  
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: (i) correlations between oil price shocks and 
stock returns are clearly and systematically time-varying; (ii) oil shocks of different types show 
substantial variation in their impact upon stock market returns; (iii) these effects differ widely 
between industry sectors; and finally (iv) China is seemingly more resilient to oil price shocks 
than the US. These findings have important implications for both practitioners and policy makers. 
To illustrate this we discuss how time-varying correlations could be utilised in financial 
investments, why these correlations differ so greatly across industries and economies and what 
would be the more immediate financial consequences. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology and data used 
in the study, Section 3 presents the empirical findings and Section 4 concludes the study. 
 
2. Methodology 
In light of the issues discussed in Section 1, the aim is to apply a methodology that achieves 
several goals. First is to model the (endogenous) relationships between oil production, economic 
activity and oil price changes, allowing for some pre-determined structural relationships in the 
modelling framework. Second, and given the output from the first part, we identify the oil price 
shocks of different types (i.e. supply-side and demand-side). Third, using the derived oil price 
shock series, we establish how sensitive aggregate stock market indices and industry specific 
portfolios are to these shocks, and additionally consider whether such sensitivities are evolving 
over time. 
 
2.1. Structural VAR model and historical price decomposition 
Following Kilian (2009), our analysis begins by modelling the endogenous relationships between 
the estimation variables using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of the form: 
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where, tz  is a [3×1] vector of endogenous variables containing world oil production, the global 
economic activity index and real oil price returns, noting that the order of the variables is 
important. Kilian (2009) uses price levels instead of returns; the reason for us using returns here 
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is because of our desire to establish correlation with stock market returns. In Equation (1) 0A  
represents the [3x3] contemporaneous matrix used to identify the structural relationships, iA  are 
[3x3] autoregressive coefficient matrices, εt is a [3×1] vector of structural disturbances, assumed 
to be serially uncorrelated and p denotes the order of the SVAR model which is set equal to 24 
months. The covariance matrix of the structural disturbances takes the following form: 
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That is to say, there are no cross-equation co-variances in the residuals. Estimation of the SVAR 
is often done using a reduced form VAR obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (1) with 
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The reduced form errors te  
are therefore linear combinations of the structural errors tε , with a 
covariance matrix of the form   '1010'  DAAee ttE . The structural disturbances can then be 
derived by imposing suitable restrictions on 1
0

A . Here, following Kilian (2009), the restrictions 
are identified based on macroeconomic priors rather than an empirical identification scheme
3
. 
Specifically, the following block-recursive short-run restrictions are used: 
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Thus, oil supply shocks are only due to innovations in oil production. Aggregate demand shocks 
can be come from one of two sources, namely real activity specific shocks, but also from shocks 
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 Granger causality tests and Directed Acyclic Graphs are two common empirical identification schemes used in 
SVAR applications. See for example Swanson and Granger (1997) or more recently Mjelde and Bessler (2009). 
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to global oil production. Finally, the structural oil-market specific demand shocks are not only 
due to unexpected oil price changes, but also unexpected disruptions to the production process 
and sudden, and unpredictable, shifts in global economic activity. 
These identifying restrictions are motivated as follows: (1) crude oil supply will not respond to 
oil demand shocks within the month, given the costs of adjusting oil production and the 
uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market; (2) increases in the real price of oil driven by 
shocks that are specific to the oil market will not lower global real economic activity within the 
month, given the sluggishness of global real activity; and (3) innovations to the real price of oil 
that cannot be explained by oil supply shocks or shocks to the aggregate demand for industrial 
commodities must be demand shocks that are specific to the oil market. 
The estimation of the SVAR model in Equation (1) allows us to proceed to the historical 
decomposition on the oil price return series. Kilian and Park (2009) suggest that the 
decomposition can be done by “simulating the path of the real price of oil from [the estimated 
SVAR model] under the counterfactual assumption that a given shock is zero throughout the 
sample period. The difference between this counterfactual path and the actual path of the real 
price of oil measures the cumulative effect of the shock at each point in time.” (page 1272, 
footnote 6). Accordingly, in the present paper, we decompose the real oil price return series, as 
follows: 
- Oil supply shocks: by setting the oil supply innovations to zero for all periods, then 
calculating the counterfactual values of real oil price returns and recording them. 
- Aggregate oil demand shocks: by setting the global economic activity innovations to zero 
for all periods, then calculating the counterfactual values of real oil price returns and 
recording them. 
- Oil-market specific demand shocks: by setting the oil price innovations to zero for all 
periods, then calculating the counterfactual values of real oil price returns and recording 
them. 
These shocks are effectively an identity decomposition of the reduced form innovations into their 
structural components, and in this regard, by definition the three series must sum up to the 
reduced form innovations for the oil price equation. It is of course possible to extract other shock 
series from the model, such as the two shocks that affect global economic activity, but as these 
are not used here we do not discuss them further. 
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The derived shock series are “global”, in the sense that they are derived using measures of global 
oil production, global economic activity and global oil prices. Therefore the same shocks are 
used for both China and the US. This is further justified by acknowledging that China and the US 
are two of the largest oil importers in the world. 
 
2.2. Estimating dynamic correlations in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity 
To understand how oil shocks of different types affect stock markets and their constituent 
industry sectors, the dynamic correlations between these series are estimated. Several aspects 
must be considered within estimation. The dynamic correlations must be conditional on all of the 
available information in order to accurately describe the evolution of correlation, and not for 
instance simply characterize discrete differences across two (or more) pre-defined sample 
windows. Additionally, given the frequency of the observed data (which are monthly as 
described in Section 3), auto-regressive heteroskedasticity may be a further concern (GARCH).  
One candidate method often used to describe conditional correlations in the presence of GARCH 
is that of Engle (2002) who proposed the dynamic conditional correlation method (DCC) as a 
means to describe the time varying nature of correlations among variables conditional upon 
historically observed relationships.  
Recently, though, Caporin and McAleer (2008, 2011) have argued that the BEKK of Baba, Engle, 
Kraft and Kroner (1991, working paper) and Engle and Kroner (1995) may be superior to DCC 
both theoretically and empirically. More specifically they argue that the Engle (2002) DCC does 
not strictly formulate a dynamic conditional correlation. Therefore, here we apply BEKK rather 
than DCC.  The standard BEKK model requires the estimation of    2221 nnn   parameters, 
thus a less general version is commonly applied, named the Scalar-BEKK model. One advantage 
of this is that the Scalar-BEKK model is guaranteed to be positive definite and requires the 
estimation of fewer parameters than the BEKK model, i.e.    221 nn  parameters. In this 
present case this is advantageous since our data are monthly frequency only, and the number of 
observations (and hence degrees of freedom available for estimation) is relatively smaller than 
compared with higher frequency data. 
The DCC of Engle (2002) directly estimates the correlation matrix, BEKK on the other hand 
evaluates the correlations indirectly. In this method, the data in tΥ , reflect a multivariate vector 
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containing market/portfolio returns tr  and the oil price shocks contained in tε , are assumed to 
follow a conditionally normal distribution:  
),0(~| 1 ttt N HΩΥ   (6) 
In which 1tΩ  is the information set at time t-1, and assuming a first order GARCH process: 
BBHAAΣCCH   11 ttt  (7) 
For the scalar representation, the assumption is that A  and B  are linearly related by a scaling 
factor i.e. δAB  , see for example Silvennoinen and Terasvirta (2009) for further discussion of 
the scalar BEKK and other multivariate GARCH methods. Given the estimated time-varying 
variances in tH , the time-varying correlations between two variables i and j in the system are 
then constructed using the relationship: 
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That is to say, in the case of BEKK, the time varying correlations are derived from the estimated 
model, whereas for DCC they are directly estimated. Additional useful discussion on the 
relationships between DCC and BEKK functional forms can also be found in Ding and Engle 
(2001), notwithstanding the important discussions already alluded to in Caporin and McAleer 
(2008, 2011) among others. 
 
3. Data Description  
In this study we use monthly data starting from January 1995 through to July 2013 on aggregate 
US and Chinese stock market indices (NYSE and Shanghai Composite index, respectively) and 
also on selected industrial sector indices from both countries (Banks, Metals & Mining, Oil & 
Gas, Retail and Technology). The choice of these indices was partly motivated by Kilian and 
Park (2009) and based on the fact that they reflect the main components of an economy. These 
data have been extracted from Datastream® for the US and the Chinese Stock Market and 
Accounting and Research database (CSMAR) for China
4
. 
                                                          
4
 The industry classifications for the Chinese firms are less clear/consistent than for firms in the US. Portfolio values 
are constructed manually from the firm level data using the following classifiers: Retail: H01, H11, H1120, H1199 
Metal & mining: B01, B0101, B05, B0501, B07, B0701, B0740, C65, C6510, C67, C69, C6901, C6935, Banks: I01, 
Oil & Gas: B03, B5003, C41, Technology: C51, C 5110, C 5115, C55, G, G81, G8101, G8115, G83, G8310, G85, 
G8599, G87, G8701, G8799. 
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In addition, monthly data have been collected January 1990 through to July 2013 for world oil 
production (OILPROD), oil prices (OILP) and global economic activity (GEA) index, which are 
used for the estimation of the oil price shocks, as discussed in Section 2.1
5
. World oil prices are 
approximated by Brent crude oil, considering that this type of oil represents 60% of the world oil 
daily consumption (Maghyereh, 2004). The world oil production data serve as a proxy for world 
oil supply. The data for the Brent crude oil price and world oil production have been extracted 
from the Energy Information Administration, whereas the global economic activity index has 
been borrowed from Kilian‟s (2009) paper, and is based on dry cargo freight rates6. The period 
of the study is motivated by the availability of the Chinese data, as well as, the data on global 
economic activity index and the fact that we required a common sample period for the two 
countries. Prices are expressed in real dollar terms and are transformed into log-returns. Figure 1 
exhibits the evolution of the series during the common sample period. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The effect of the 2007/09 global financial crisis is evident in Figure 1, where stock market 
returns (aggregate and industrial sectors) exhibited a significant higher volatility and negative 
returns. In addition, the global economic activity index suffered a significant drop during the 
same period of time, suggestive of the global economic downturn of that time. Similar patterns 
are observed in the oil price returns and changes in oil production. 
Furthermore, Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the series under investigation. From 
Table 1 we observe that Chinese aggregate stock market returns, as well as, industrial sectors‟ 
returns exhibit a significantly higher volatility compared to the US market. Nevertheless, the 
highest volatility is observed in the global economic activity index. All US stock returns show a 
negative skewness indicating that there is a longer tail on the left side of the probability density 
function and the bulk of the returns are found to the right of the mean returns. The reverse is 
observed for the Chinese stock returns, with the exception the Shanghai index returns. 
Furthermore, almost all series are leptokurtic, with the only exception being the GEA. Finally, 
none of the returns (apart from the Chinese retail and technology industrial indices) are normally 
distributed, as indicated by the Jarque-Bera statistic.   
                                                          
5
 These data start earlier than the financial market data since the VAR model requires at least 24 months additional 
data for all of the lag terms. This allows us to produce historical decompositions that cover the whole of the 
observed financial market data. 
6
 The data, which now cover a longer time-series than in the 2009 paper, can be found in Lutz Kilian personal 
website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/). 
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[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
4. Empirical Findings  
This section presents and discusses the results. Firstly the historical oil price change 
decomposition from the estimated SVAR is given. The second and main part of this section then 
concentrates on the analysis of the time-varying correlation between the three oil price shocks 
and stock market returns of China and the US (aggregate and industrial sectors returns). 
 
4.1. Oil shocks of different types (estimated historical decompositions). 
Figure 2 exhibits the cumulative effect of the three oil price shocks on oil price returns. The main 
effects are observed primarily from oil-market specific demand shocks and then from aggregate 
demand shocks. We can also notice that during the 2007/09 global financial crisis, aggregate 
demand shocks had a significant negative effect on oil prices. It can be seen that the 
contributions of oil shocks to oil price returns are generally mean reverting in the sense that they 
do not persist a clear trend. This is a marked difference from the contributions given in Kilian 
(2009), but is readily explained by the use here of oil price returns rather than prices in levels. 
The contribution of supply side shocks to price returns is generally notional comparing with 
aggregate and oil-market specific demand shocks.  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The interesting question, though, is how these shocks are affecting stock market returns over 
time. Thus, in the next section we proceed with the analysis of the time-varying correlation 
between the three oil price shocks and stock market returns from China and the US.    
 
4.2. Time-varying correlations. 
4.2.1. Aggregate stock market indices 
We start our analysis with the time-varying correlations
7
 (see Figure 3) between the three oil 
price shocks and aggregate stock market returns (i.e. the Shanghai Composite index and the 
NYSE index). Recalling from Section 1 we would expect aggregate demand shocks to exhibit 
mainly positive correlation with stock market returns on the premise that these shocks are driven 
by the global economic activity. Thus, higher economic activity should drive stock prices up, 
                                                          
7
 For sake of brevity the Scalar-BEKK results are not presented here but they are available upon request. 
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while at the same time it increases the price of oil. The reverse should hold for oil-market 
specific demand shocks. These shocks generate uncertainty in the market, driving oil prices to 
higher levels, while at the same time stock prices down. Supply-side shocks are expected to 
show low or zero correlation with stock market returns considering that current evidence 
suggests these shocks do not currently exercise any important impact in the economy.    
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
A preliminary visual assessment of the time-varying correlations in Figure 3 allows us to note 
some interesting features. Primarily we can observe that correlations do not remain constant but 
instead they vary over time. This finding reinforces our conjecture that the relationship between 
stock markets and oil price shocks should not be examined in a purely static environment. 
Furthermore, almost all correlations fluctuate between both positive and negative regions. This is 
suggestive of the fact that stock market returns tend to exhibit a fundamentally different 
relationship with oil price shocks during different time periods, and not just a marginally 
different one. In addition, correlations seem to have a higher magnitude for the NYSE index as 
compared to the Shanghai Composite index, for most of the period under examination, implying 
that the US market is more responsive to oil price shocks. Nevertheless, during turbulent periods, 
such as the early 2000 recession and the Great Recession of 2007/09, both stock markets exhibit 
similar magnitude. Overall, though, this finding implies that the Chinese stock market is 
relatively more „secure‟ against oil market based risk. This latter finding is also in line with 
Nguyen and Bhatti (2012) who report that the Chinese stock market is not affected by oil prices 
during the period 2000-2009. 
Turning the focus now on the NYSE index, the evidence suggests that the highest level of 
correlation is found with the aggregate demand shocks for the largest part of our sample. In 
addition, this correlation is always positive, as expected. The next highest correlation is found 
between NYSE index returns and oil-market specific demand shocks. Oil-market specific 
demand shocks tend to show a moderate positive correlation throughout the sample period, with 
the exception of the period 2003-2005. In addition, during the Great Recession of 2007/09 we 
observe a considerable increase in the positive correlation.  
The finding that oil-market specific demand shocks are positively correlated with stock market 
returns during recessions seems counter-intuitive, given that past findings suggest a negative 
relationship. However a quick look at the data (in Figures 1 and 2) serves as a reminder that 
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particularly the Great Recession period bared witness to an unprecedented and sustained fall in 
oil prices, a significant decrease of oil-market specific demand shocks, as well as, the collapse of 
the financial markets i.e. a clear and strong co-movement in the same direction.  
Another plausible explanation of this positive correlation between the oil-market specific shocks 
and stock market returns can be found in the fact that apart from the uncertainty about the future 
availability of oil, there is evidence that financial speculation in the oil market has also been 
driving oil-market specific shocks (Kilian and Lee, 2014; Kilian and Murphy, 2014). A number 
of authors claim that the increased speculation the oil market, due to the increased participation 
of hedge funds, has created an increased correlation between oil prices and stock returns (Fattouh 
et al., 2013; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Tang and Xiong, 2012; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2011; 
Alquist and Kilian, 2010; Buyuksahin et al., 2010; Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2010). Thus, such 
financialisation of the oil market could justify the positive correlation between the stock market 
returns and the oil-market specific shocks.  
Supply-side shocks do not show a high correlation with stock market returns. In addition, this 
correlation is mainly low and negative with the exception the periods between mid-2000-2004 
and 2012-2013. 
It is worth noting that there is a divergence between the time-varying correlation of aggregate 
demand shocks and oil-specific demand shocks with the US stock returns over 2003-2006 and 
2012-2013. However, there is not such divergence during other periods, such as the global 
financial crisis. A plausible explanation of this fact can be the following. 
The period 2003-2006 is characterised by an upward movement of the global economy, as 
depicted by the Global Economic Activity index in Figure 1, as well as, a bullish period of the 
US stock market. Thus, on one hand we observe a positive correlation between the aggregate 
demand shocks and the US stock market return. On the other hand, this period does not justify 
any precautionary actions in the oil market. Consumer sentiment has been shifted away from 
precautionary actions, given the good economic conditions. This explains the almost zero 
correlation that we observe between the US stock market returns and the oil-market specific 
shocks. However, the two negative correlations between the US stock market returns and the oil-
market specific shocks that are observed in 2003 and 2005 can be justified by the conflict in Iraq 
in 2003, the conflict in Nigeria in 2005 and the hurricanes of Katrina and Rita in 2005.  
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The divergence of the correlations between the two demand-side shocks and the US stock market 
returns during the period 2012-2013 can be explained by the Syrian civil war, as well as, the 
continued conflicts in the Middle East crisis. These events trigger positive oil-market specific 
shocks (i.e. price hikes) and stock markets respond negatively to such news. This can explain the 
downward trend of the correlation between the oil-market specific shocks and the US stock 
market returns from 2011 onwards, as well as, their negative correlation in the post-2012 period. 
On the other hand, the correlation between aggregate demand shocks and the US stock market 
returns continues to be positive, as expected. 
The fact that aggregate demand shocks and oil-market specific shocks do not diverge during the 
crisis can be explained by the fact that oil demand during this period was extremely low due to 
the severe economic conditions across the world. Thus, there is a lower aggregate demand, lower 
consumption of oil and thus lower uncertainty about its future availability, pushing oil prices 
downwards. This is also depicted in Figure 2, where a significant drop in both demand-side 
shocks can be observed during the global financial crisis. In addition, stock markets were 
declining in this period. Hence, overall we do expect this positive correlation between the stock 
market returns and each of the two demand side shocks. 
Regarding the Shanghai Composite index, correlations are generally lower compared to those of 
the US market. More specifically, aggregate demand shocks mainly exhibit a low positive 
relationship with Chinese stock market returns, apart from the period 2007-2009, where a high 
positive correlation is observed. Oil-market specific demand shocks generate very low 
correlation levels with Shanghai composite index returns, which fluctuate between both positive 
and negative levels. There are two periods which exhibit a markedly different behaviour, which 
are from 1997 until 1999 and from 2008 until mid-2009. Finally, Chinese stock market returns 
exhibit mainly a very low positive correlation with supply-side oil shocks, with a notable peak in 
the correlation observed in 1999. 
Interestingly, the correlation of changes in oil price returns due to supply-side shocks with US 
stock returns (negative to zero) and with Chinese stock returns (moderately positive) show very 
different patterns. It is useful to offer some explanation as to why this might be so. A brief look 
at the 2014 edition of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (British Petroleum, 2014) 
reveals some interesting features of import diversity that may help to explain this. The US and 
China each have a different set of import partners: For the US the main import partner is Canada, 
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with additional major supply streams coming from the Middle East, South and Central America, 
Mexico and West Africa; China conversely has the Middle East as its dominant supplier of oil, 
with large quantities from West Africa, The Former Soviet Union, Other Asia Pacific countries 
and also South and Central America. Since the import portfolios differ, there would naturally be 
different economic uncertainties created by a supply-side disruption which would almost 
certainly be a localised event. That is to say for example, a supply disruption in Canada would 
evidently be a major concern for US oil imports providing more than 30% of US imported oil, 
but Canadian oil represents only around 0.4% of the Chinese oil import portfolio. Put another 
way, the source of the supply disruptions will play a role in describing the differences in the 
responses by the US and Chinese stock markets. Finally in attempting to justify why the 
correlation for China might be positive compared to a negative or zero correlation for the US, we 
defer to the fact that these economies are each in very different stages of economic development, 
the positive correlation for China may well be a temporary phenomenon as it passes through the 
stages of transition from a developing towards a developed economy. 
So far we have documented that the behaviour between the two stock market returns and oil 
price shocks differ significantly. The next step in our analysis is to examine the aforementioned 
correlations during some key important events that triggered certain oil price shocks, similarly to 
Filis et al. (2011). Adapted from Filis et al. (2011), Table 2 summarises the oil price shocks over 
time as these have been identified by Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009a,b). 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
It has to this point been illustrated that the US market is generally more responsive to oil price 
shocks compared to the Chinese stock market. This is even in the case of the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997 where the correlation between the Shanghai Composite index returns and the 
aggregate demand shocks fluctuated around 0.05, whereas, at the same time the correlation was 
at about 0.12 for the NYSE. Another important finding is the difference in correlation levels 
between stock market returns and aggregate demand shocks during the Chinese economic boom. 
Over this period the correlation between the NYSE index and aggregate demand shocks was 
fluctuating between 0.13 and 0.20, whereas for the Shanghai Composite was between 0.10 and 
0.37. The strong positive correlation exhibited in the Chinese stock market during 2007 is 
expected and a plausible explanation is that the booming of the Chinese economy at that period 
was driving both oil prices and the local stock market index to higher levels. Hamilton (2009b) 
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has also documented that the significant rise in oil prices that was observed in this period can be 
explained by the Chinese industrialisation and growth. Furthermore, the latest global financial 
crisis (2007-09) caused an important increase in the correlation levels for both China and the US, 
signifying the importance of this crisis in both oil and stock markets. Still, though, there is a 
substantial difference between the two stock markets as the correlation for China peaked at the 
level of 0.39, whereas for the US it was at the level of 0.56. 
Turning our attention to the correlations between oil-market specific demand shocks and stock 
market returns, Figure 3 highlights that the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US was associated with a 
moderate positive correlation between the NYSE index and oil-market specific demand shocks 
(about 0.22). The same correlation for the Shanghai Composite index was almost zero implying 
that even though the terrorist attack in US affected oil prices and the US stock market, it did not 
have a major impact in the Chinese stock market. Surprisingly, the correlation between the oil-
market specific demand shocks and stock market returns during the second invasion in Iraq (19 
March to 1 May 2003) was almost zero for both markets, despite the fact that the NYSE and the 
Shanghai Composite indices exhibited a moderate increase during these months. This could be 
suggestive of the fact that this event did not have an impact on oil prices, whereas both stock 
markets reacted positively to it.  
Figure 3 further reveals that during the supply-side shocks of 1998-99 and 2002 the NYSE index 
exhibited a somewhat different behaviour, with a correlation level of about -0.10 for the former 
period and about 0.20 for the latter year. On the contrary, the correlation for the Shanghai 
Composite index was mainly positive during 1998-1999 (ranging between 0.02 and 0.33). For 
the year 2002 the correlation fluctuated between 0.08 and 0.17, suggesting a lower positive 
correlation compared to the NYSE index.  
The evidence broadly shows that all correlations exhibit different patterns during the two US 
recessions that are covered by our sample. More specifically, during the early 2000 recession all 
oil price shocks exhibit a moderate correlation of about 0.20 with the NYSE index returns, 
whereas different oil price shocks showed a different correlation pattern with the Shanghai 
Composite index returns (i.e. negative correlation with oil-market specific shocks, low positive 
correlation with supply-side shocks and moderate correlation with aggregate demand shocks). 
This does not hold true for the 2007/09 global financial crisis where the demand side shocks 
demonstrated a significant increase in their correlation with the two indices. This is indicative of 
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the fact that the latest US recession, which originated from the financial crisis, had a major 
impact not only in the US but also around the world. It is also indicative of the fact that the latest 
financial crisis negatively affected both the financial and oil markets. Considering that the 
2007/09 global financial crisis had a severe demand side effect on the economies, the low 
correlations that are observed between the supply-side shocks and the two indices are expected.  
Overall, we document that the relationship between the three types of oil price shocks and stock 
market returns is not constant over time and it varies depending on the events that take place in 
certain times. We also find that the US market seems to be more responsive to oil price shocks, 
regardless of their origin. Thus, the risk diversification opportunities between oil price changes 
and stock market returns are seemingly lower for the NYSE index compared to the Shanghai 
Composite index. Finally, consistent with Broadstock et al. (2012), the correlation patterns 
observed for the Shanghai Composite index illustrate that the Chinese stock market did not seem 
to be particularly influenced from the oil market between 1998 and 2007.  
A plausible explanation of this resistance of the Chinese stock market to oil price shocks during 
the period 1998-2007 can be attributed to the fact that the Chinese economy experienced 
persistent high growth during this period enabling China to be relatively less influenced by oil 
price shocks. This is also documented by Nguyen and Bhatti (2012) who maintain that negative 
effects of oil prices shocks are absorbed by the Chinese economic growth. However, as domestic 
urbanisation and industrialisation continues, China is becoming increasingly more influenced by 
international factors, and since the step-change in the structure and nature of the global economy 
that took place since 2007 we can observe that its stock market is more responsive to global oil 
price shocks than it had previously been. This latter observation could in part reflect that China 
has become an increasingly popular prospect for international investors who are more likely to 
adjust their holdings in stock markets in response to international shocks, such as oil price shocks.  
 
4.2.2. Industrial sector indices 
The discussion so far has considered the broad similarities and differences of the aggregate stock 
markets in China and the US. However, as already widely documented in existing literature, oil 
price pass through effects vary across industry. The next step of our analysis is then to examine 
these correlations using industrial sector returns. Arouri et al. (2012, p.611) claim that "the use of 
equity sector indices is, in our opinions, advantageous because market aggregation may mask 
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the characteristics of various sectors". In this section we have chosen to focus indicatively on 
five key industrial sectors that are expected to be responsive to oil price shocks. These sectors 
are broadly consistent with those considered in Kilian and Park (2009). Specifically we consider: 
Metals & Mining, Oil & Gas, Retail, Technology and the Banking sector.  
Figure 4 shows the time-varying correlations for the two oil-related sectors of our sample, i.e. 
Metals & Mining and Oil & Gas.  
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
As discussed in Section 1, existing evidence suggests that these two sectors are positively 
influenced by oil price changes. The time-varying correlations offer partial, but not complete, 
support to this evidence. More specifically, across the US sectors, correlation levels are generally 
positive, although some low negative correlations exist with oil-market specific demand and 
supply-side shocks during our sample period. In addition, aggregate demand and oil-market 
specific demand shocks are highly correlated with the Metals & Mining sector, whereas oil-
market specific demand shocks are more strongly correlated with the Oil & Gas sector. 
Surprisingly, though, the Chinese sectors for Metals & Mining and Oil & Gas exhibit low 
positive correlations with all three oil price shocks. These correlations are particularly low during 
the early period of the study, as well as during the period 2012-2013, where small negative 
correlations are observed. One notable exception to this trend is during the 2007/09 global 
financial crisis, when the correlations between the two demand side shocks and the two sectoral 
indices demonstrate a significant increase.  
Next we focus on the Retail and Technology sectors (see Figure 5). Consistent with above, in 
these two cases we still generally observe that correlations are higher for the US sectors 
compared to those of China, most apparently for the Technology index. Further, we notice again 
that the correlations for the Chinese sectors tend to fluctuate mostly around low levels of 
correlation with the exception being the period of the 2007/09 global financial crisis. Both 
sectors are influenced positively, as well as, negatively by the three oil price shocks, hence we 
cannot observe a persistent one way correlation between the Retail and Technology index returns 
and oil price shocks of any type. Having said that, the only exception is the correlation level 
between the US Technology index and the aggregate demand shocks, where a constantly positive 
correlation is exhibited. This is can be explained by the fact that even though positive aggregate 
demand shocks increase the price of oil, they also signify an increase in aggregate demand, 
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which is regarded as positive news and thus certain stock prices could exhibit more bullish 
behaviour. These findings are in contrast with much of the readily available information from the 
existing literature which generally suggests that oil price changes are negatively influencing both 
sectors (see Section 1). This difference in the results could exist due to the fact that previous 
studies did not decompose oil price shocks into their different sources and also that they have 
examined the said relationships at a static environment. Our results, though, are however much 
more consistent with theoretical priors, and in this regard they are much more plausible. 
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
The last sector to be considered is the Banking sector. Figure 6 reveals that the Chinese Banking 
sector is more responsive to oil price shocks compared to the US banking sector.   
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
More specifically, the Chinese banking sector is positively correlated (low to moderate) with 
aggregate demand shocks and negatively correlated with oil-market specific demand shocks. 
Supply-side shocks and the Chinese banking sector‟s returns exhibit a low to zero correlation 
level, with the exception of the period 1999-2001. By contrast, correlations between the US 
banking sector‟s returns and the two demand side shocks are mainly positive but low. In addition, 
the US banking sector has a low correlation with supply-side shocks, which fluctuates between 
both positive and negative correlations.  Overall, the findings imply that demand-side oil price 
shocks are less severe upon the US banking sector than they are for China, whereas the supply-
side shocks do not really seem to affect either index.  
In attempting to draw some policy implications that can be used to inform investment decisions 
several points can be offered. The first is that financial investment decisions can be supported by 
a better understanding of when and what types of oil shocks impact upon stock market returns. 
Furthermore, by considering the returns of specific industrial sub-sectors investors are provided a 
much clearer understanding of which types of stocks may be safer than others to oil shocks. In 
addition, due to the positive correlation between oil shocks and overall stock indices, turbulence 
the oil market could not be considered a „safe haven‟ to shield against potential losses in wider 
stock market portfolios. Finally, the evidence of systematic dynamic correlations presented in 
this paper should provide a means of establishing reasonable short-term expectations/projections 
of oil shock impacts upon stock markets, potentially offering insights into hedging strategies. 
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This last point has not been discussed here, since to do so formally would have altered the focus 
of the paper substantially, though is potentially worth exploring in further work. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine the time-varying correlations between oil prices shocks of 
different types (supply-side, aggregate demand and oil-market specific demand) and stock 
market returns, using a Scalar-BEKK model. For this study we consider the aggregate stock 
market indices from two countries, China and the US. In addition, we also consider correlations 
from key selected industrial sectors, namely Metals & Mining, Oil & Gas, Retail, Technology 
and Banking. The sample period runs from 1995 until 2012.  
Importantly, the findings of this study complement the existing literature in two regards. First, 
some existing literature has already established that stock markets tend to respond differently to 
different oil price shocks (see, inter alia, Degiannakis et al., 2014; Basher et al., 2012; Kilian and 
Lewis, 2011; Filis et al., 2011; Kilian and Park, 2009; Kilian, 2009; Apergis and Miller, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the existing literature has not focused on the time-varying relationship between the 
individual oil price shocks and stock market returns. In this respect, we find that the stock market 
response to oil price shocks is different over time. More specifically, the evidence suggest that 
the US stock market is more responsive to oil price shocks compared to the Chinese stock market, 
as it exhibits a higher level of correlation with oil price shocks throughout the studied period. In 
addition, the US market is always positively related with the aggregate demand shocks, whereas 
this does not hold true for China. The results apply to both aggregate stock market and industrial 
sectors returns, although the reverse observations can be made for the banking sectors of these 
two countries. The second key contribution to existing literature is that we document different 
responses across industries, suggesting that investors need to be aware of the different behaviour 
of the industrial sectors towards oil price shocks.  In some cases this leads to important and 
internally consistent conclusions (with respect to macro-economic theoretical priors). Thus, the 
insights offered here are more informative. 
The analysis given here is in our opinion interesting, building on the innovative and insightful 
contributions of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009). There yet remain many further ways 
to explore and extend the analytical framework. Perhaps the most obvious “limitation” for want 
of a better term is that the analysis is only semi-structural. More specifically, although the oil 
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market and economic activity measure might reflect some form of global market structure, the 
financial indicators are region specific. This is not a weakness per se especially given the VAR is 
structural, hence the impacts of oil on the global economy are not influenced by the financial 
markets. Nonetheless it would be interesting to “complete” the structural model by integrating 
some combined measure of global financial markets. Other issues deserving of more attention 
are the possible asymmetries in the effect of oil price changes which could be handled more 
explicitly and also potential structural instabilities over the sample period, both of which have 
been the focus of numerous prominent studies. 
There may be one relevant institutional feature relevant in interpreting the conclusions that has 
not yet been mentioned. The regulation of financial markets in US and China has one very 
distinctive difference in terms of the freedom of price movements. Specifically, Chinese stock 
markets are regulated to allow prices to vary only within a 10% window on any given day. In the 
present data it is unclear whether this limit is met frequently or not, but nonetheless could be an 
influencing factor in mediating a relatively smaller correlation than compared to the US where 
no such controls are in place. This however would be best considered in future studies using firm 
level data, rather than the portfolios considered here.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the series under examination, 1995:01-2013:07. 
  S&P500 US_BANKS US_METALS US_OIL US_RETAIL US_TECH 
Mean 0.0037 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0065 0.0060 0.0051 
Maximum 0.1310 0.3385 0.2671 0.1307 0.1226 0.1933 
Minimum -0.2791 -0.3372 -0.7396 -0.3614 -0.3233 -0.3213 
Std. Dev. 0.0469 0.0794 0.0987 0.0592 0.0571 0.0786 
Skewness -1.2576 -0.0806 -1.9136 -1.2321 -1.1014 -0.5719 
Kurtosis 8.2050 6.7873 16.0630 8.4471 7.3678 4.4573 
Jarque-Bera 309.1118* 132.9211* 1713.9170* 330.6299* 221.3516* 31.7446* 
 
SHANGHAI CH_BANKS CH_METALS CH_OIL CH_RETAIL CH_TECH 
Mean 0.0045 0.0075 0.0139 0.0088 0.0029 0.0131 
Maximum 0.2795 0.7600 0.4566 0.6742 0.2555 0.3758 
Minimum -0.2867 -0.4511 -0.4123 -0.3616 -0.2899 -0.3017 
Std. Dev. 0.0841 0.1378 0.1165 0.1310 0.0898 0.1066 
Skewness -0.0841 1.2809 0.0309 0.7307 0.0601 0.1809 
Kurtosis 4.0727 9.0670 4.4035 6.3527 3.1421 3.5656 
Jarque-Bera 10.9061* 401.1832* 18.25608* 123.7275* 0.3203 4.1696 
 
ΔOILPROD GEA ΔOILP       
Mean 0.0010 0.0245 0.0066 
   Maximum 0.0267 0.5914 0.1967 
   Minimum -0.0196 -0.5026 -0.2976 
   Std. Dev. 0.0071 0.2721 0.0871 
   Skewness 0.2073 0.2017 -0.7319 
   Kurtosis 4.0531 2.0800 3.9663 
   Jarque-Bera 11.9027* 9.3759* 28.5856*       
Note: The descriptive statistics correspond to the log-returns of the series under investigation. US and CH in the 
names of the industrial sectors denote the country of origin. Global Economic Activity index (GEA) is not 
transformed in log-returns as the index reflects itself changes in the global economic activity.  
* and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.   
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Table 2: Important oil price shocks over the period 1995-2013. 
Event   Year   Oil price shock origin 
Asian Economic Crisis 
 
1997 
 
Aggregate demand side 
Several oil production cuts by OPEC 
 
1998-1999 
 
Supply side 
Housing market boom 
 
2000 
 
Aggregate demand 
9/11 terrorist attack in US 
 
2001 
 
Oil-market specific demand 
PdVSA worker's strike 
 
2002 
 
Supply side 
Second war in Iraq 
 
2003 
 
Oil-market specific demand 
Chinese economic growth 
 
2006-2007 
 
Aggregate demand 
Global financial crisis   2007-2008   Aggregate demand 
Note: These oil price shocks have been identified by Kilian‟s (2009) and Hamilton‟s (2009) findings. This table has 
been adapted from Filis et al. (2011). 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Time-series plots of data used in the analysis, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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Figure 2: Estimated oil shocks according to their origin, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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Figure 3: Time-varying correlations of aggregate index returns with oil shocks, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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Figure 4: Time-varying correlations of Metals & Mining and Oil & Gas sectors returns with oil shocks, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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Figure 5: Time-varying correlations of Retail and Technology sectors returns with oil shocks, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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Figure 6: Time-varying correlations of Banking sector returns with oil shocks, 1995:1-2013:07. 
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